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As commercial integration reduces the reliance on foreign trade taxation, raising tax revenue has 
become a major concern for the governments of developing economies. This paper examines how 
the tax burden in a developing economy should be distributed between capital income and labor 
income.  We study a two-sector model, where the traditional sector is “informal” and consequently 
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1.   Introduction 
Raising tax revenue is an important concern for the governments of developing economies.  
Not only are tax revenues small, but the structures of the tax systems differ substantially from we 
observe in industrial countries.  For developing countries, indirect taxation is the main source of 
government revenue, representing in some cases up to 80% of total tax receipts, while personal and 
corporate taxes never account for more than 25%.  By contrast, in OECD economies, personal and 
corporate income taxation provides over 40% of tax revenues, while indirect taxation is only 27%; 
see Tanzi (1987) and Mesere and Owens (1989).  As developing countries grow, they need to 
generate larger tax revenues to finance the enhanced public services concomitant with a developed 
economy.  Since indirect taxes are already at a high level, comparable to that in industrial countries, 
increasing tax revenue will require higher personal income tax rates, thus raising the question of the 
form that this increase in taxation should take.1  This paper examines how the tax burden in a 
developing economy should be distributed between capital income and labor income.   
An extensive literature on the optimal taxation of factor incomes in a dynamic setting has 
evolved.  The main message to emerge from this is that in the long run, capital income should not be 
taxed, thus shifting the burden from factor income taxation toward labor; see Chamley, 1985, 1986; 
Judd, 1985, 1999, and Lucas, 1990.  Indeed, in many developing countries interest income, if taxed 
at all, is taxed at a rate below the tax rate on labor income.2  The standard optimal taxation result 
would imply that this is an efficient tax structure, although, being strongly regressive, it may not be 
desirable once equity considerations are taken into account.3  In this paper we show that in contrast 
to the conventional view, taxing labor income more heavily than capital income may also be 
inefficient from a growth and welfare standpoint.  
We study a two-sector economy with a modern and a traditional sector, in which agents 
                                                 
1 The importance of increasing direct taxation has been stressed by a number of studies on tax reform in developing 
countries, such as Ahmad and Stern (1991). This is particularly important since not only do indirect taxes account for a 
large fraction of total revenue, but also value added tax rates in developing countries are already at a level comparable to 
those in industrial countries; see Tait (1988). 
2 See Tanzi and Zee (2001). 
3  Jiminez (1986) documents that in most developing countries the tax system is highly regressive. 2 
allocate their endowment of time and capital between the two sectors.  Both sectors use private 
capital and labor, with the modern sector having a more capital-intensive technology. In addition, the 
aggregate capital stock provides an externality that is consistent with an equilibrium of ongoing 
growth, as in Romer (1986).  Consumers are infinitely-lived and identical in all respects except for 
their initial endowment of capital.  We derive a macroeconomic equilibrium in which the economy’s 
growth rate, the sectoral allocation of resources and thus the relative size of the two sectors, and the 
distribution of income, all become jointly determined.   
  It is often argued that the production structure of the economy, and in particular the degree to 
which certain activities are commercialized as opposed to black-market or subsistence-oriented, is a 
major determinant of the capacity of governments to raise tax revenue.  To capture this feature of 
developing economies we simply assume that all traditional sector activities are informal, and 
consequently non-taxable by the government.  Depending on the country, estimates of the proportion 
of the male non-agricultural labor force that work in the informal sector range between 15 and 90%, 
and while the average for the OECD is 17%, it rises to 60% for less developed economies.4  These 
figures indicate the importance of the black market economy in developing countries and hence of 
the fiscal constraints that it imposes on their governments.  
A number of authors, such as Todaro (1989), have emphasized the “buffer function” of the 
informal sector, which absorbs the hours of work that individuals choose not to spend in the formal 
production sector.  Hence we model labor supply decisions not as a tradeoff between work and 
leisure, but as the allocation of a fixed amount of time between formal sector employment and an 
informal productive activity.  Empirical evidence on the elasticity of labor supply in developing 
countries is scarce due to the difficulty of having data on formal plus informal hours of work.  But 
once the amount of time the individual devotes to informal/domestic production is taken into account 
in calculating total hours worked, existing evidence seems to support the hypothesis of a total fixed 
labor supply; see Skoufias (1996).  
  We assume that the only feasible fiscal instruments are proportional taxes on the capital and 
labor incomes generated in the formal sector.  We also assume that the government fixes the amount  
                                                 
4 See Thomas (1992), United Nations (2000), Ihring and Moe (2000). 3 
of revenue that it wants to raise, and obtain the (second-best) optimal tax structures under two 
possible scenarios.  First, we suppose that the government redistributes the revenue raised from the 
capital-rich to the capital-poor, so that all revenue is rebated to consumers in lump-sum transfers. 
Our results are striking. On the one hand, we find that to maximize the growth rate, subject to the 
fixed revenue objective, requires capital and labor incomes to be taxed at the same rate.  To 
understand this result note that both taxes are distortionary, as they shift capital and labor toward the 
informal sector.  In fact, they generate two types of distortions: they affect both the allocation of 
factors across sectors and within sectors.  Equalizing the tax rates eliminates the distortion within 
sectors.  The capital-labor ratio in the formal sector adjusts to offset exactly the tax distortion, so that 
factor prices are those that would prevail in the absence of taxes, and growth is maximized. On the 
other hand, under the sectoral capital intensity assumption being made, maximizing welfare requires 
the capital income tax to exceed the tax on labor income.  In addition to the above growth effect, 
taxes also have a level effect on welfare since too little capital and labor are employed in the formal 
sector, thus reducing the aggregate level of output.  Now consider any given tax rate, τ .  The 
distortion arising from taxing capital income at rate τ  is equivalent to that of taxing labor income at 
the same rate.  However, since the formal sector is capital-intensive, the capital income tax raises 
more revenue than does the labor income tax.  It is therefore optimal to tax capital income more 
heavily in order to raise a given amount. 
As an alternative scenario, we consider the case in which the government purchases some of 
the final good in order to provide the infrastructure required to operate the formal sector technology.  
The idea that the use of a modern technology requires the provision of public infrastructure – and 
consequently the raising of taxes – has been suggested to explain the existence of a large, low-
productivity, informal sector in developing countries.5  We use a simple version of this setup to 
highlight the differences between the previous case, in which public expenditure does not involve 
the purchase of goods, and the case in which it does.  Public provision of infrastructure changes the 
aggregate budget constraint, and this has important implications.  If the only use of government 
                                                 
5 See Dessy and Pallage (2002). See also Fortin, Marceau, and Savard (1997) for alternative explanations of the 
existence of an informal sector. 4 
revenue is the provision of infrastructure, then taxing both capital and labor incomes at a rate equal 
to the infrastructure requirement equalizes the (static) private and social rates of return.  In this case 
the level of output is optimal, implying that both growth and welfare are maximized when the tax 
rates on capital and labor income are the same and equal to the infrastructure requirement.  But if 
some of the revenue is used for transfers, the resulting divergence between private and social rates of 
return would generate a level effect, and requires taxing capital income more heavily than labor 
income in order to maximize welfare.  
A number of recent works have examined the circumstances under which optimal factor 
taxation may involve a non-zero tax rate on capital income. This literature has focused on two issues.  
First, the desirability of taxing capital can stem from suboptimal capital accumulation in a growing 
economy, caused by a technological externality associated with capital accumulation as in 
Turnovsky (1996), or by excessive savings when agents are credit rationed, as in Chamley (2001).  
The second reason is associated with restrictions on the taxation of factors. Correia (1996) shows 
that when a production factor is non-optimally taxed, a positive or negative tax on capital will be 
required, depending on whether the untaxed factors are complements or substitutes to capital.  Jones, 
Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) find that the impossibility for the government to tax human capital and 
workers’ time separately implies that the tax rates on both capital and labor incomes should be 
positive. Turnovsky (2000a) examines a setup with an elastic supply of labor and productive 
government expenditure.  He shows that, if all other fiscal instruments are optimally chosen, the tax 
rate on capital income should be zero.  But if government expenditures are not set optimally, then 
positive capital income taxation may be required.  Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet (2003) develop an 
overlapping-generations model with altruistic individuals. Under the assumption that inherited 
wealth cannot be taxed, it is optimal to tax or subsidize capital, in order to indirectly affect inherited 
wealth.  All these papers can be seen as examples of the argument in Judd (1999) that it is the 
presence of constraints (for the government or the individual) or suboptimal expenditure choices that 
makes capital income taxation desirable.  Hence, they are second-best results. 
Our contribution to this literature is threefold.  First, we explore an alternative scenario in 
which capital income taxation is desirable, one that is particularly relevant for developing countries, 5 
namely the impossibility to tax a sector rather than a factor. Second, we illustrate that the use of tax 
revenue is crucial in determining the structure of taxes. Most of the literature assumes that all 
revenue is rebated in lump-sum transfers to consumers; see, for example, Chamley (2001). Our 
analysis shows that optimal tax rates depend on whether it is consumers or the government that 
spend the revenue, implying that the assumption of how the revenue is used is not innocuous.  Third, 
although previous work has found that a non-zero tax rate on capital income may be desirable, in 
almost all cases the optimal rate remained well below that for labor income.6  Our analysis provides 
a rationale for taxing capital income at least as much as, and possibly more heavily than, labor 
income. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 briefly sets out a basic one-sector model to 
serve as a benchmark against which we may compare our results.  Section 3 then describes the two-
sector economy, with the optimal tax structure being derived in Section 4.  Section 5 supplements 
the analytical results with some numerical simulations, while Section 6 concludes, noting some 
caveats.  Technical details are minimized throughout the text and relegated to an Appendix. 
2.  The Basic One-Sector Model  
We begin by considering a conventional one-sector economy with a representative agent who 
we assume supplies a unit of labor inelastically.  We shall derive the first-best and second-best 
optimal tax structures, which we will then compare to those of the two-sector economy.  
2.1  Technology and Returns 
There is a mass 1 of firms, indexed by j.  A representative firm produces output according to  
   (, ) jj j YF A L K = , 
                                                 
6 One exception is Fuest and Huber (2001), who using a static model, find that for some agents the optimal marginal tax 
rate on capital income is higher than that on labor income.  Another is Koskela and Schöb (2002) who study optimal 
factor taxation in the presence of unemployment, resulting from union-firm bargaining when capital is internationally 
mobile but labor is immobile.  Assuming that the government in setting taxes behaves as a Stackelberg leader toward the 
private sector, they also find that in the presence of unemployment capital should generally be taxed at a higher rate than 
labor.  To the extent that unemployment is important in developing economies, these results are particularly relevant in 
the present context.  6 
where  Kj denotes the individual firm’s stock of capital, ALj are the efficiency units of labor 
employed by the firm, and F(.) is assumed to have constant returns to capital and labor.  All firms 
are identical and hence in equilibrium they will all choose the same level of employment and capital 
stock. That is,  j K K =  and  j L L =  for all j. 
We further assume that there is an externality associated with the stock of capital, so that the 
efficiency of labor depends on the average stock of capital in the economy, K. In particular,  K A = , 
such that aggregate output Y is linear in the stock of capital.  That is, 
      ( ) ,( ) YF L K K K f L =≡ .        ( 1 ’ )  
There is perfect competition in factor markets, so that wages and rates of return on capital are 
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Since the labor supply, L, is constant, the interest rate, r, and factor shares, s W ≡′   f  (L)L / f (L) and 
) ( / ) ( 1 L f L L f sK ′ − ≡ , are all constant, while the wage rate grows at the same rate as does capital. 
2.2 Consumer  Optimization 
The representative agent maximizes lifetime utility, taken to depend upon consumption, 
C(t), as represented by the isoelastic utility function 
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subject to the flow budget constraint 
    (1 ) (1 ) KW Kr Kw L C ττ =− +− −  ,       ( 3 b )  
where  K τ  and  w τ  are, respectively, the capital income and wage income taxes. The solution to this 
problem yields the equilibrium growth rate, ψ , together with the consumption-capital ratio c ≡ C /K 7 
   
( 1 ) (() () )
1






      ( 4 a )  
    () cf Lψ =−          ( 4 b )  
Substituting (4a) and (4b) into (3a) the welfare of the representative individual along the equilibrium 
path can be expressed as 
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where ρ > γψ  by the transversality condition, and γW > 0.7    
2.3.   First- and Second-Best Optimal Taxation 
It is well-known (see, for example, Romer, 1986) that because of the presence of the 
externality associated with capital, the competitive economy will not yield the socially optimal rate 
of growth.  The socially optimal equilibrium takes into account the effect of the capital externality 










,         ( 4 a ’ )  
and the corresponding consumption-capital ratio still given by (4b).  Comparing (4a’) to (4a), we see 
that the socially optimal growth rate can be achieved in the competitive economy by subsidizing the 
return to capital at the rate capital τK
* =−sW /( 1− sW).  In the absence of any lump-sum taxation, the 
government’s tax choices are restricted by its budget constraint  0 WK wL rK τ τ + = .  Substituting for 
*
K τ  and the factor returns, w, r, this implies 
* 1 W τ = , so that the subsidy to capital must be financed by 
fully taxing labor income. 
  Suppose now that at each point in time the policy maker wants to raise a fixed fraction of 
output, θ , as revenue using the capital income and labor income taxes only.  We are not concerned 
with how this revenue is spent.  The government budget constraint is then θY = τWwL+ τKrK, which 
                                                 
7The transversality condition is lim
t→∞λKe
−ρt = 0 , where λ  denotes the shadow value of capital. 8 
can be expressed as τWsW + τKsK = θ.  We can now determine the second-best tax rates that would 
maximize the growth rate and welfare, given the target government revenue, θ .  Differentiating the 
expression (4a) for ψ , and since L, and therefore the return to capital, is constant, we obtain 












The growth rate is maximized by setting the lowest possible capital income tax, that is, by setting the 
highest possible wage income tax. Since τW  is bounded above, the optimal policy is to set 
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which implies 
   









Note that  ˆ  τ  K can be positive or negative (i.e. a tax or a subsidy), depending on the size of 
the required government revenue. However, even when capital income is subsidized, the first-best 
growth rate cannot be obtained as long as θ > 0. 
Consider now the welfare-maximizing tax policy.  Differentiating (5) we can show that 
  














Welfare is then maximized when capital is subsidized at the first-best tax rate τK
* =−sW /( 1− sW). 
However, this implies a wage tax of  W W W s s / ) ( θ τ + = , which exceeds 1 and hence is infeasible.  
The second-best policy is then to set the wage tax as high as possible, i.e. to chose  ˆ  τ  W  and  K τ ˆ  in 
accordance with (6).  Such taxes will simultaneously maximize growth and welfare.  These results 
can be summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: A.  The first best optimum in the one-sector economy can be 
replicated by subsidizing capital at the rate:  ˆ (1 ) KW W ss τ = −− , financed by fully 
taxing labor income.  B.  Consider the second-best optimum, where the objective is to 9 
raise a fraction, θ , of output from tax revenue.  Fully taxing labor at the maximal rate 
ˆ 1 W τ =  and capital at the rate  ˆ () ( 1 ) KW W ss τ θ = −−  will maximize both the growth 
rate and welfare. 
The clear message from the one-sector model is that for both objectives, the tax burden should be 
more heavily borne by the fixed factor, labor. 
3.  The Two-Sector Economy 
We now modify the basic model in two dimensions. First, we assume that agents are 
heterogeneous and differ in their initial capital endowments, as in Bertola (1993). Second, we seek to 
capture an important feature of developing economies, namely the fact that much of the production 
takes place outside the formal sector, in a second sector, termed the informal sector.  The latter, 
being less organized, is characterized by a lower capital intensity than is the formal sector.  Also, 
being less structured, economic activities in the informal sector are less transparent to the 
government and thus can avoid all taxes. 
  We continue to maintain the assumption that aggregate labor is fixed, abstracting from the 
labor-leisure choice.  While this assumption has the advantage of analytical convenience, it is not 
implausible for a developing economy.  Given the low levels of consumption in such countries, it is 
unlikely that much leisure is consumed.  Rather, what happens is that flexibility regarding hours of 
employment leads to variations in the labor supplied to the formal sector, with individuals then 
devoting the remaining time to informal productive activities, in the way that we model it.  But given 
the importance of this assumption, in the concluding section we briefly discuss the modifications to 
our results when labor is supplied elastically, arguing how this basically reinforces our key findings. 
3.1.   Technology and Returns 
We shall denote the formal and informal sectors by 1 and 2, respectively.  Output in each 
sector is produced by capital and labor in accordance with the production functions 
[ ] 11 1 , YF L K K =           ( 7 a )  10 
[ ] 22 2 , YG L K K =         ( 7 b )  
where  K1 and K2 denote the capital stock of a representative firm in sector 1 and sector 2, 
respectively;  K = K1 + K2 is the economy-wide stock of capital, and L 1K,  L2K measure the labor 
supply in each sector in efficiency units.  We normalize the stock of labor so that L 1 + L2 =1.  
Both production functions are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale in the private 
factors, employment and the private capital stock.  In addition, the aggregate stock of capital yields 
an externality such that in equilibrium, the production functions are linear in the accumulating stock 
of capital, as in Romer (1986).  We further assume that the use of the formal technology requires the 
provision of infrastructure.  The amount of infrastructure required is proportional to the level of 
output of that sector, so that in order for the economy to produce Y 1 the government must spend an 
amount  1 Y φ  on infrastructure, with  1 < φ .   
The private returns to capital and labor are represented by their respective marginal physical 
products. Letting  11 kK K ≡  and  22 kK K ≡  denote the shares of aggregate capital employed in the 
formal and the informal sectors, respectively, and since 
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we can write factor payments as 
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     ( 8 b )  
3.2.   Government Policy 
The government is assumed to tax income from capital and labor in the formal sector, at rates 
K τ  and  W τ , respectively.  There are two types of government expenditure.  First, the government 
must finance the infrastructure requirement of the formal sector,  1 Y φ .  Second, the government is 
assumed to be concerned about the distribution of income.  An amount T is hence rebated as a lump-11 
sum transfer to all agents, and the policy-maker fixes the fraction of formal-sector output that is to be 
spent on transfers, so that T = θY 1 where θ  is given.  The government budget constraint is then 
11 1 1 1 () WK wL rK Y τ τθ φ += + ,        ( 9 )  
and we will term θ the “transfer rate” and φ the “infrastructure requirement.” 8 
3.3.   Consumer Optimization 
There is a mass 1 of infinitely-lived agents in the economy.  Consumers are indexed by i and 
are identical in all respects except for their initial stock of capital, Ki0.  Since the economy grows, we 
will be interested in the share of individual i in the total stock of capital, ki, defined as  ii kK K ≡ , 
where  K is the aggregate (or average) stock.  Aggregating over the individual capital stocks, 
ki i ∑ =1, that is, the distribution of relative capital endowments has mean 1.  In addition, we assume 
that the variability of the endowments across agents is given by the standard deviation, σk and the 
range is  0, kk  ∈ .   
All agents supply a unit of labor inelastically.  A fraction, L 1i, may be allocated to 
employment in the formal sector, with the remainder, L2i, being spent in the informal sector, such 
that  11 22 , ii
ii
LL LL == ∑∑  and  12 1 ii LL + = . Similarly, his total stock of capital, Ki, is allocated 
between the two sectors.  His objective is to select his portfolio of assets, allocation of labor time, 
and the rate of consumption to maximize lifetime utility, taken to depend upon consumption, Ci(t), 
and represented by an isoelastic utility function. Formally, the problem is 
0
1
max ,    with  - 1
t
i Ce d t
γρ γ
γ
∞ − ∞< < ∫         ( 1 0 )  
subject to 
   11 1 1 2 2 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) iK i W i i i i Kr Kw Lr K w LT C ττ =− + − + + + −      (11a) 
                                                 
8 Other types of public spending that involve the purchase of goods by the government – e.g. if formal sector production 
depended on the quality/quantity of infrastructure that the government provides, or if a public consumption good entered 
the consumers’ utility function- yield equivalent results. Such formulations, however, complicate the analysis as the 
optimal amount of government expenditure is to be endogenously determined. 12 
   L 1i + L2i = 1          (11b) 
   12 ii i KK K +=           ( 1 1 c )  
The first-order conditions are 
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where λ  is the shadow value of capital, and  1 υ , and υ2 are the multipliers associated with the labor 
and capital allocation constraints, respectively. 
Combining equations (8) with (12c) and (12d), we obtain the static allocation conditions for 
capital and labor, 
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The first-order conditions (12a) and (12b), together with (12d), imply the rate of growth of 
consumption 












        ( 1 4 a )  
Observe that the only difference between agents, namely their initial stock of capital, does not 
appear in this equation.  Hence all individuals choose the same consumption growth rate. This has 
two implications.  First, the aggregate rate of growth, ψ , is identical to the individual rate of growth 13 
and unaffected by the initial distribution of endowments, that is  
   () ( ) () 11 11 11 (1 ) / / /
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,     (14b) 
Second, since the capital stock of all agents grows at the same rate, the distribution of capital 
endowments does not change over time. That is, at any point in time, the wealth share of agent i, ki, 
is given by his initial share ki,0. 
Using the government budget constraint (9) to substitute for the transfer, and aggregating 
over the individuals, we simply have that the flow of physical goods in the economy to consumption 
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3.4.  Macroeconomic Equilibrium  
It is straightforward to show that the unique macroeconomic equilibrium in the two-sector 
economy is a balanced growth path determined by the following conditions: 
Resource Constraints  
     L 1 + L2 =1         ( 1 7 a )  
     k1 + k2 =1         (17b)   
Equilibrium Factor Allocations 
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Equilibrium Growth Rate 
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Goods Market Equilibrium 
   11 1 22 2 (1 ) ( / ) ( / ) ck f L k k g L k φ ψ =− + −      (17f) 
The first four equations are the static efficiency conditions, and together they determine the 
allocation of labor and capital across sectors, L 1,L2,k1,k2.  Once capital and labor are allocated across 
sectors, the equilibrium growth rate follows. The last equation then determines the consumption-
capital ratio as a function of sectoral allocations and the growth rate.  
The effects of changes in the two tax rates on the allocation of factors across the two sectors 
and on the growth rate is examined in the Appendix.  There it is shown that a critical factor 
determining some of these effects is given by the sign of the expression 
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The assumption we are making, namely that the formal sector is more capital intensive, implies that 
in equilibrium L2 / k2 > L1 / k1. Given this assumption, if the tax rate on capital income is at least as 
high as that on wages, then M is certainly positive, an assumption we shall maintain.   
The following qualitative effects of changes in the two tax rates on the allocation of factors 
across the two sectors are obtained:  
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As expected, since only the formal sector is taxed, an increase in either of the two tax rates shifts 15 
capital and labor away from the formal sector.  Consider the effect of an increase in  W τ . The higher 
tax rate implies that the net wage in the formal sector is lower than the wage in the informal sector; 
hence labor moves to the latter.  This tends to reduce the wage in the informal sector and increase 
that in the formal one.  At the same time, the increase in L2 raises the marginal product of capital in 
sector 2 and reduces that in the formal sector.  Capital must therefore flow from the formal to the 
informal sector in order to compensate this discrepancy and equalize again the (net) rates of return.  
Moreover, for M >0, we have 
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An increase in either of the two taxes shifts both capital and labor from the formal sector into the 
informal one. Under the assumption that the formal sector is more capital intensive than the informal 
one, the change in factor allocations also results in an increase in the capital-labor ratio in both 
sectors. The reason for this is that as resources move away from the capital-intensive sector and to 
the labor-intensive sector, the capital-labor ratios in the two sectors must rise to maintain full 
employment of capital and labor.  
  It is important to note that the above allocative effects hold even if no capital is employed in 
the informal sector. In this case, the entire stock of capital is used by the formal sector, and the only 
static decision is the allocation of labor between the two sectors.  An increase in either tax rate 
would shift labor to the informal sector, thus increasing the capital output ratio in the formal sector.9 
Consider now the effects of taxes on the growth rate.  Define 












≡= − ,          
so that α and (1−α) are, respectively, the capital and labor shares in the formal sector. The effects 
of changes in the two tax rates on the growth rate are then given by 
                                                 
9 As will be clear below, all our results hold in this case. For an example of an economy where the informal sector uses 
































       (20b) 
implying that raising either tax reduces the growth rate.  That increasing the tax on capital income 
reduces growth is standard, since output growth is driven by the accumulation of capital.  In our 
setup, taxing labor income also dampens growth because of the indirect impact that  W τ  has on the 
return to capital.  Taxing wages results in a higher capital-labor ratio in both sectors; consequently 
the (gross) rate of return to capital, and the output growth rate, fall.  This effect is also present when 
there is an increase in the capital income tax.  There is hence a reduction in the gross interest rate as 
well as in the net interest rate, implying that the reduction in the growth rate is greater than if the 
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The first-term captures the standard effect of capital income taxes obtained in the benchmark 
model of section 2. The second term in brackets is new, and represents the reduction in growth due 
to the fall in the (gross) return to capital caused by a misallocation of factors across sectors. 
3.5.   The Distribution of Income 
The heterogeneity of agents raises the consequences of tax policy for the distribution of 
income.  To consider this, we note that the income of agent i is given by  
   11 1 1 2 2 2 2 () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) iK i W i i i YK r K w L r K wL T τ τ =− + − + + +  
With all individuals being identical, except for their initial endowments of capital, they will in fact 
allocate factors in the same proportions across sectors, so that  11 1 1 1 ;  ii i KK K KkL L == =  (and 
analogously for sector 2).10  Using equations (9) to substitute for the transfer, we can then write 
                                                 
10We wish to clarify the following point regarding notation.  For the most part we shall be dealing with aggregate 
quantities and shall let  12 , kk shall refer to the shares of aggregate capital employed in sectors 1, 2, respectively.  In our 17 
( ) 11 11 22 2 2 1 1 1 () ii i K i YK r k K w L r kK wL r k K K kf K τφ =+ ++ + − −. 
Two things are worth noting here. First, agents receive a net subsidy if their capital is below the 
average, and pay a net tax otherwise.  Second, only the fraction of the transfer θ that is financed 
through capital income taxation actually entails direct redistribution. Since all agents supply the 
same amount of labor, the revenue raised through wage taxation and rebated has no distributional 
impact. Nevertheless, because both taxes change factor prices, both will have an indirect effect on an 
agent’s relative income. 
In order to examine the effects of taxation on the income distribution, we consider the 
relative income of an individual with capital ki,  ()( ) ii yY KY K ≡ , which can be expressed as11 
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     ( 2 1 )  
Equation (21) emphasizes that the distribution of income depends upon two factors, the initial 
(unchanging) distribution of capital, and the equilibrium allocation of factors across sectors, insofar 
as this determines factor rewards.  Under plausible conditions  1 ω < , and the variability of income 
across the agents, σy, is less than their (unchanging) variability of capital, σk.12  In fact, 
       yk σ ωσ = .          ( 2 2 )  
4.  First- and Second-Best Optimal Taxation 
  We now consider the implications of the informal sector for optimal tax policy, considering 
the first-best and second-best policies in turn. 
4.1.   The First-Best Optimum 
As a benchmark, we suppose that the social planner has no redistributive goals, i.e. θ = 0, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
brief discussion of individual agents we shall denote the relative capital endowment of individual i by  i k .  The intended 
meaning should be clear from the context. 
11To derive (21) we make extensive use of the definitions of factor returns given in (8) and the equilibrium factor 
allocation conditions given in (17c,17d). 
12A simple sufficient condition to ensure that  1 ω <  is that  K τ φ > .  In our simulations we find ω  to be 0.23 and 0.32. 18 
and simply maximizes the utility of the individual with average capital holdings. The social 
planner’s decision problem is then to choose average consumption, the rate of capital accumulation, 
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11 22 (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) KF L K K G L K K C φ =− + −        ( 1 1 a ’ )  
L 1 + L2 =1          ( 1 1 b ’ )  
K1 + K2 = K          ( 1 1 c ’ )  
The macroeconomic equilibrium derived by the central planner comprises the resource constraints, 
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and the goods market equilibrium condition (17f).  Comparing these to the equilibrium conditions 
(17) for the decentralized economy we immediately see that as long as only the formal sector can be 
taxed it is impossible to replicate the first best optimum.  The efficient sectoral allocation requires 
WK τ τφ ==  (with  0 WK τ τ ==  if there are no infrastructure requirements), in which case the growth 
rate in the decentralized economy is too slow.  
By contrast, if the government were unconstrained and could tax both sectors, it would be 
possible to replicate the first best optimum.  Denoting the wage taxes in sectors 1 and 2 by  ,1 W τ  and 
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where the tax rates must satisfy the government budget constraint, in this case 
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     (24) 
Equations (23a) require the relative tax rates in the two sectors to ensure that the relative after-tax 
factor returns in the two sectors are socially optimal, while the capital income tax,  1 K τ , must be set in 
such a way as to equate the private and social return to capital.  Solving these four equations we can 
show that the optimal taxes on labor are  ,1 ,2 ˆˆ1 WW τ τ = = .  In the absence of infrastructure requirements 
capital income in both sectors should be subsidized at the common rate  11 ˆ () K f fL k f τ ′′ =− − .  If 
0 φ > , then  ,1 ,2 ˆˆ K K τ τ > , which may require capital income in the formal sector to be taxed if φ  is 
sufficiently large.  We may summarize these results with 
Proposition 2: A.  If only the formal sector can be taxed, the first-best optimum 
equilibrium cannot be replicated by taxing labor income and capital income alone.   
B.  The first-best optimum can be attained if both sectors can be taxed.  In this case, 
labor income in both sectors should be fully taxed and the revenue used to subsidize 
capital income.  
The results in the second part of the proposition, requiring the full taxation of labor income used to 
finance a subsidy to capital income, are thus direct extensions of the one sector model. 
4.2.    Second-Best Taxation 
Redistributive Government Expenditure 
In order to highlight the differences between the implications of the two types of government 
expenditure we analyze them separately. This section obtains the optimal tax structure when there is 20 
no infrastructure requirement in the formal sector; the next section examines the case in which there 
is as well an infrastructure requirement.   
Suppose that  0 = φ . The government budget constraint can be expressed as  
     (1 ) WK α τα τθ −+ =         ( 2 5 )  
where the capital and wage shares,α  and  α − 1 , are a function of 1 1 /k L .  We need to consider how 
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    (26) 
where σ  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the formal sector. The first term 
captures the direct effect of changing the wage tax, and it is always negative since for a given 
allocation of factors, a lower wage tax requires a higher capital income tax. The second is the 
indirect effect stemming from the fact that changes in the tax rates affect the allocation of factors 
across sectors and hence change the revenue raised by a particular tax. The sign of this effect 
depends upon which tax is larger (i.e. which tax is already creating a larger distortion) and on 
whether capital and labor are substitutes or complements in the formal sector. 
We can now consider the second-best policies of maximizing the growth rate and welfare.  











       ( 2 7 )  
where the components appearing in (27) are obtained from (20a), (20b), and (26), respectively.  
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     (27’) 21 
which implies that growth is maximized when  KW τ τθ = = .13 
  The intuition for this result can be seen clearly from (27), where we see that the direct effect 
of an increase in the wage tax is to reduce the growth rate.  At the same time, to the extent that the 
higher wage tax permits a lower capital income tax, this is offset by an indirect positive effect on the 
growth rate.  If the two tax rates happen to be equal,  K W τ τ = , then these two effects are exactly 
offsetting and the growth rate remains unaffected by the substitution.  If  WK τ τ >  the direct negative 
effect of a higher wage tax on the growth rate more than exceeds the increase due to an associated 
reduction in the tax on capital income, implying that the growth rate can be increased by reducing 
W τ  and correspondingly increasing  K τ .  The reverse holds if  K W τ τ > . 
We now consider the policy that maximizes the welfare of the individual holding the average 
capital stock. We could follow the approach used in much of the optimal taxation literature and 
assume a utilitarian welfare function.  Since individual welfare is concave in consumption, and 
hence in individual capital, such a social welfare function would imply that some redistribution 
would be optimal. This would require positive capital income taxation. By focusing on average 
welfare, we abstract from such a reason for taxing capital, and consider the optimal choice of tax 
rates for a given revenue requirement. 
The welfare of the individual with an average endowment can be expressed as 
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    (28) 
where we have used the goods market equilibrium condition,  11 1 22 2 (/) (/) ck f Lk k g Lk ψ = +− , to 
substitute for consumption, and defined z as   
    ) / ( ) / ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 k L g k k L f k z + ≡ .       ( 2 9 )  
  Equation (28) does not yield a tractable solution for the optimal tax rates.  Note, however, 
                                                 





= < .  Using (26), it is straightforward to show that this result holds when no capital is used in the 
informal sector so that  12 1, 0 kk == .   22 
that when the two tax rates are equal, growth is maximized, and the second term in (28) disappears. 













.      ( 3 0 )  
As long as the capital intensities in the two sectors differ, (28) and (30) together imply that a 
homogeneous tax rate,  KW τ ττθ === , will not maximize welfare.  In the more plausible case 
where the formal sector is more capital intensive,  2 2 1 1 / / k L k L < , implying that  /0
WK W dW d
ττ τ
= < .  
Maximizing welfare then requires setting the wage tax below θ  and the capital income tax above θ , 
that is, WK τ θτ << . If it were the informal sector that had a greater capital intensity, then maximizing 
welfare would require the relative tax rates to be set in accordance with  K W τ θτ << , although as we 
note in Section 4.3 below the solution will in fact be a corner solution. 
The intuition for these results is easily established. In the absence of policy constraints, that 
is, if both sectors could be taxed, it would be optimal to raise all revenue through a labor income tax, 
just as in the basic one sector model. Such a tax would not discourage capital accumulation, and with 
labor incomes in both sectors taxed at the same rate, it would not distort the allocation of labor 
across sectors. The inability to tax the informal sector means that imposing a wage tax on the formal 
sector reduces the labor supplied to that sector and consequently the marginal product of capital, and 
capital accumulation. Taxing only labor is hence no longer optimal. 
Taxing the informal sector only has two distortionary effects. One the one hand, it distorts 
the allocation of factors across sectors; on the other it changes factor intensities within each sector. 





















Clearly, one of the distortions is eliminated.  Factor intensities in the informal sector are the same as 
they would be in the absence of taxes, while the capital-labor ratio in the formal sector increases so 
as to exactly offset the direct effect of the tax on factor returns.  Net factor prices are hence 
unchanged by the introduction of taxes, and growth is maximized.  23 
  But equalizing the two tax rates will not maximize welfare.  As well as a growth effect, taxes 
have a level effect on welfare, as they shift capital and labor toward the informal sector, and hence 
reduce aggregate output.  The impact of the taxes on aggregate output will depend on relative factor 
intensities.  Contrary to the one-sector model, a wage tax and a capital income tax have equivalent 
allocative distortions, as even a wage tax distorts sectoral allocations.  However, if the formal sector 
is more capital-intensive, imposing a given tax rate on capital income raises more revenue than 
imposing the same rate on wages.  It is therefore optimal to tax capital income more heavily.14  
Infrastructure and the Second-Best Optimum 
Suppose now that a positive amount must be spent in infrastructure in order to operate the 
formal technology, φ > 0. The government budget constraint is   
   (1 ) WK α τα τθ φ −+ = + ,         ( 2 5 ’ )  
and the aggregate budget constraint  11 1 22 2 (1 ) ( / ) ( / ) ck f L k k g L k φ ψ = −+ − , since some final good is 
used by the government to provide infrastructure. 
As before, differentiating the growth rate and given that equation (26) still holds we have 








=      
which implies that growth is maximized whenever τK = τw = τ . Maximizing welfare now requires 
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where  
    11 1 22 2 (1 ) ( / ) ( / ) zk f L k k g L k φ ≡− +  .       ( 2 9 ’ )  
                                                 
14 The result that maximizing growth need not coincide with welfare maximization is not new.  It was first obtained by 
Futagami et al. (1993) in a model in which the stock of public capital enters the production function.  Turnovsky (2000b, 
Chapter 13) notes two other diverse contexts in which this result occurs.  These include: (i) the introduction of 
adjustment costs in investment that depend upon productive government expenditure, and (ii) an economy subject to 
stochastic productivity shocks. 24 
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Suppose now that the social planner has no redistributive goals, θ = 0.  In this case,  φ τ = , 
implying 








= .         ( 3 1 )  
Welfare maximization thus requires not only that the tax rates be equal, but also that they be set 
equal to the infrastructure requirement.  For  KW τ ττ φ = ==, growth and welfare are consequently 
maximized. Using the formal technology incurs a social cost which is not directly taken into account 
by individuals – the infrastructure requirement.  Setting  KW τ ττ φ = == implies that the (static) 
private returns to capital and labor in the formal sector are equal to the social returns. Static 
allocation decisions are hence optimal and output is maximized. Since growth is maximized 
whenever  K W τ τ = , welfare is maximized. 
  When the redistribution rate is positive, however, taxing capital and labor incomes at the 
same rate will not maximize welfare.  For θ > 0, taxing both types of income at the same rate 
implies  KW τ ττ θ φ == = + .  From equation (30’) and assuming that the formal sector is more 
capital intensive, we have that  /0
WK W dW d
ττθ φ τ
== +< . Welfare maximization hence requires a higher 
tax rate on capital than on labor income,  WK τ θφτ < +< .  
  We may summarize these second-best optimum results with 
Proposition 3:  Consider a government that wishes to raise a fixed amount of revenue 
by taxing the formal sector.   
A.  If it wishes to do so in a way that maximizes the growth rate then it should tax 
labor income and capital income equally, irrespective of how it intends to spend the 
revenue.   
B.  If it wishes to do so in a way that maximizes average welfare, the optimal taxes 25 
will depend on how the revenue is spent.  If it is spent on infrastructure, then equal 
taxation of labor and capital income is again optimal.  If it is redistributed, then labor 
income should be taxed less than capital income as long as the formal sector is more 
capital intensive than is the informal sector.  
It is important to note that the optimal tax structure as set out in Proposition 3 rests 
crucially upon the static allocation conditions (17c), (17d), which in turn assume the 
existence of an interior solution.  As long as the production function is sufficiently flexible so 
that the “Inada conditions” are met, this is feasible, irrespective of the size of the informal 
sector.  In the limit, either because the informal sector vanishes, or the production function is 
insufficiently flexible for (17c) and (17d) to hold, the allocation decision breaks down.  The 
production factors are no longer free to move between the sectors and we are essentially back 
in the one-sector economy. 
4.3  Factor Intensity Reversal 
  We have based our discussion on the relevant case for a developing economy, where 
the formal sector is relatively capital intensive.  We now briefly comment on the case where 
the factor intensities are reversed,  11 22 Lk Lk > , and we shall assume further that  0 M < .  
As before, an increase in either tax rate,  , K W τ τ  will shift productive factors from the formal 
to the informal sectors, so that the qualitative responses in (19) will remain unchanged.   
However, if  11 22 Lk Lk > , resources are now moving from the labor intensive to the capital 
intensive sector.  Capital therefore increases in relative scarcity and thus its rate of return 
must increase for factor market equilibrium to prevail, thereby raising the growth rate.   
Consequently, an increase in either tax rate is associated with a higher growth rate, a fact that 
can also be seen directly from (20a), (20b).  
 Setting  K W τ τ =  again implies that  0 W dd ψ τ = , but this time it is growth-
minimizing, rather than growth-maximizing.  Instead, the growth-maximizing tax policy is 
now a corner solution and it is straightforward to verify that this is achieved by fully taxing 
labor income in the formal sector, setting  1 W τ = , with the corresponding tax (or subsidy) on 26 
capital being  () α α φ θ τ / ) 1 ( − − + = K , just as in the one-sector economy.  Maximizing 
welfare also leads to a corner solution.  This can be most directly seen in the case in which 
the revenues are spent on infrastructure, when welfare maximization and growth 
maximization coincide.  In this case (30’) is welfare-minimizing and the optimum again is to 
set 1 W τ =  with the corresponding tax on capital satisfying  (( 1) ) K τ φα α = −− . 
5.  Some Numerical Simulations  
  The result summarized in Proposition 3 calling for the tax on labor income to be reduced 
below that on capital income is striking.  Table 2 provides some numerical results contrasting the 
implications of growth-maximizing fiscal policy with welfare-maximizing fiscal policy.  These are 
based on the parameters summarized in Table 1.   
  These parameters are standard.  The preference parameters include a rate of time preference 
of 4% and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.4.  The production functions in the two 
sectors are taken to be CES production functions.  For the formal sector the elasticity of substitution, 
1 σ = , making it Cobb-Douglas, while for the informal sector two values of 1,  0.5 σ = , are 
considered.  The production parameters are chosen to yield an equilibrium in which the informal 
sector is more labor intensive, as we have been assuming.  The total rate of government expenditure 
is 20%, and the three cases where this is spent all on infrastructure, split between infrastructure and 
redistribution, and entirely redistributed, are considered.  Base tax rates equal to 20% on both labor 
income and capital income are assumed.   
  Table 2A reports the optimal tax rates in the case where the production functions of both 
sectors are Cobb-Douglas.  In the first part of the table we find that if the objective is to raise 20% of 
tax revenues, then setting  0.20 WK τ τ ==  will succeed in achieving this, while maximizing the 
growth rate, irrespective of the allocation of the expenditures between redistribution and 
infrastructure.  Thus in all cases, for the base parameter set labor will be equally allocated between 
the two sectors, while nearly 86% of the capital stock will be employed in the formal sector 
producing 65% of the output.  The overall growth rate will be around 2.1%.  As the government 
shifts its expenditure allocation from infrastructure to redistribution, the share of income devoted to 27 
consumption rises, while income inequality, as measured byω , declines. 
  The second part of Table 2A chooses the tax rates to maximize welfare, as measured by the 
compensating variation in the initial capital stock necessary to offset the change in the policy.  As 
our results in Section 4 suggest, this is highly sensitive to the expenditure mix chosen by the 
government.  In the first row, where all expenditure is devoted to infrastructure, welfare 
maximization coincides with growth maximization, and setting  0.20 WK τ τ = =  will thus meet both 
objectives.  However, if instead, the government chooses to split its expenditure, 0.10,  0.10 φ θ == , 
welfare will be maximized by reducing the tax on labor income to 15.6% and raising the 
corresponding tax on capital to 26.6%.  This will increase the fraction of labor and capital employed 
in the more productive formal sector to 59% and 88% respectively, expanding the size of that sector 
to nearly 72%.  The higher tax on capital income stimulates consumption, while reducing the growth 
modestly to 2.08%, leading to an overall welfare gain of 0.41% over what it would be if the growth-
maximizing tax structure  0.20 WK τ τ ==  were chosen.  Income inequality also declines.  If the 
government spends its entire revenue on redistribution then the tax rates should diverge even more 
sharply;  W τ should be reduced to under 12% and  K τ  raised to over 32%, leading to a welfare gain of 
around 1.45%, and a further decline in income inequality. 
  Table 2B repeats the analysis in the plausible case where the elasticity of substitution of the 
informal sector is only 0.5.  The same pattern emerges, although the divergence between the growth-
maximizing tax rates and the welfare-maximizing tax rates increases, leading to larger welfare gains.  
Indeed, one striking feature of these numerical results is that for plausible parameters the deviation 
between the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing tax structures are substantial, generating 
potentially significant welfare gains.  
6. Concluding  Comments 
  Much economic activity in developing economies occurs in an informal sector that is beyond 
the control of the government.  In this  paper we have developed a two-sector model of such an 
economy and shown how the presence of an informal sector, in addition to a more conventional 
formal sector fundamentally changes the way that the government should set the tax rates on factor 28 
income.  The conventional proposition that tax burdens should be borne more heavily by labor 
income and that capital income should not be taxed, or that it should even be subsidized, are 
dramatically altered, when the government is unable to tax one of the two sectors.  In general, the 
inability to tax the informal sector makes it impossible to attain the first-best equilibrium.   
  Thus we have focused on second-best optima, where the government chooses to raise a 
certain set revenue in some optimal way.  If the its objective is to maximize the growth rate, then 
labor income and capital income should be taxed at the same rate, irrespective of how the revenue is 
spent.  If the objective is to maximize welfare, then how the revenue is used matters for the choice of 
taxes. When all revenue is devoted to the provision of infrastructure, both sources of income should 
be taxed at the same rate. However, as the government shifts its expenditure from infrastructure 
toward redistribution, and as long as the formal sector is relatively capital intensive, then the tax rate 
on labor income should be reduced and that on capital income raised.  This is a striking result, and 
numerical simulations support that for plausible parameterization of the model, the divergence of tax 
rates from the growth-maximization case are large. 
  We conclude by noting some caveats of the model and offering several more general 
observations.  First, a key, but not implausible, assumption is that total labor supply is inelastic, with 
the agent’s work decision being the allocation of his time across the two sectors.  To obtain some 
intuition into the robustness of our results, we have examined the consequences of endognizing labor 
supply in the basic one-sector model. Not surprisingly, an elastic labor supply calls for a reduction in 
the tax on labor income and an increase in the tax on capital relative to those obtained with a fixed 
labor supply, thus reinforcing the responses we have been discussing.  Hence we are confident that 
endogenizing labor supply will preserve our main findings regarding the relative magnitudes of the 
optimal taxes on labor and capital.  But it would be interesting to investigate the numerical 
sensitivity of these optimal income tax rates to the elasticity of labor supply. 
Second, we have focused our attention solely on taxes on labor income and capital income.  
We have seen that these suffice to replicate the first best optimum in the one-sector model, but not in 
the two-sector economy.  Moreover, a further instrument becomes necessary to attain the first-best 
optimum in the one-sector economy when labor supply is endogenized.  In either case the 29 
introduction of a consumption tax can help achieve the optimum, although its implementation when 
some of the consumption is produced in the informal sector would need to be carefully considered.  
More generally, extending the analysis to an open economy would also introduce a potential role for 
tariffs and other foreign taxes that have traditionally been important in developing economies.  But 
as discussed in the introduction, an important aspect of tax reform in developing economies is to try 
and reduce their reliance on indirect taxation.15  
Third, our treatment of infrastructure spending is very simple in that it is assumed not to 
interact directly with either consumer utility or, more to the point, with productivity in the economy.  
While such extensions may be of interest, we do not believe that they would affect the major insight 
of this paper.  Finally, although the motivation for our model is that of a developing economy, it can 
be given an alternative interpretation, more relevant for industrial economies.  Indeed, the 
formulation we have adopted is also appropriate for studying an economy comprising a 
manufacturing and a service sector.  The former is capital intensive, while the latter is labor intensive 
and is also more susceptible to tax evasion.  Our setup assumes that there is complete tax evasion in 
the service sector.  It is straightforward to parameterize the degree of tax evasion, by assuming that 
only a fraction of all revenues from the service sector can be taxed. Our conclusions are robust to 
this parameterization, indicating that even in industrial economies the constraints faced by 
governments when raising tax revenue may make it optimal to tax capital income more heavily than 
labor income.   
                                                 
15Because of the homogeneity necessary to generate a balanced growth equilibrium, the endogenous growth literature is 
necessarily restricted to constant tax rates, a restriction that applies here as well.  In a growing economy nonlinear tax 
rates would in general continually vary as the economy grows.  This would in turn imply that the growth rate continually 
varies over time, incompatible with balanced growth.   Table 1 
Basic Parameters 
 
Preference parameters:             γ = -1.5, ρ = 0.04 
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0.20  0.20  0.500   0.500  0.857   0.143  0.652   0.348  2.105  0.814  0.280  --- 
0.20  0.20  0.500   0.500  0.857   0.143  0.652   0.348  2.105  0.879  0.260  --- 
φ = 0.20,θ = 0 
φ = 0.10,θ = 0.10 
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φ = 0.20,θ = 0  0.20 0.20  0.500   0.500  0.857   0.143  0.652   0.348  2.105  0.814  0.280  0 
φ = 0.10,θ = 0.10  0.156 0.266  0.586   0.414  0.881   0.119  0.716   0.284  2.079  0.875  0.254  0.4% 
φ = 0,θ = 0.20  0.118 0.323  0.667   0.333  0.902   0.098  0.773   0.227  2.015  0.948  0.232  1.45%
 








 L 1         L 1 
 
k1            k2 
 









φ = 0.20,θ = 0  0.20  0.20  0.550   0.450  0.781   0.219  0.675   0.325  2.549  0.797  0.320  --- 
φ = 0.10,θ = 0.10  0.20  0.20  0.550   0.450  0.781   0.219  0.675   0.325  2.549  0.865  0.296  --- 







 L 1         L 1 
 
k1            k2 
 









φ = 0.20,θ = 0  0.20  0.20  0.550   0.450  0.781   0.219  0.675   0.325  2.549  0.797  0.320  0 
φ = 0.10,θ = 0.10  0.142  0.287  0.716   0.284  0.860   0.140  0.799   0.201  2.486  0.856  0.288  0.81%






  This appendix derives several results concerning the two-sector model of Sections 3 and 4. 
A.1  Comparative Static Analysis 
To examine the allocation effects of changes in taxes, write the system of equations (7) as 
−(1−τ K) ′  ′  f L 1 /k1
2 (1− τK) ′  ′  f L1
2 / k1
3 ′  ′  g L2 / k2
2 −′   ′   g L2
2 /k2
3
(1− τw) ′  ′  f  / k1 −(1− τw) ′  ′  f L 1 /k1
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The determinant of the coefficient matrix is 
  ∆=−
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         ( A . 1 )  
We assume that ∆ is negative, which is definitely the case when the two tax rates are equal, or when 
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A.2  The First-Best Optimum 
The social planner maximizes (10) subject to (11’). The solution to this problem is  
Resource Constraints  
L 1 + L2 =1            
1 2 1 = + k k              










′′ −=  
 
           
 
11 1 22 2
11 1 22 2
(1 )      
LL L LL L
ff gg
kk k kk k
φ
    
′′ −− −     
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Equilibrium Growth Rate 
  () ( ) () 22 22 22 (1 ) / (1 / ) /
1
gL k L k g L k φ ρ
ψ
γ
′ −+ − −
=
−
           
Goods Market Equilibrium 
  c = (1−φ)k1 f (L1 / k1) + k2g(L2 /k2)−ψ         
A.3 
A.3.   Redistributive Government Expenditure and Second-Best Taxation 
  We need to consider how the two tax rates vary together in order to raise a given revenue. 
Since  0 = φ , we can write the government budget constraint as (1 )( ) WK K α ττ τθ − −+ = , and totally 
differentiate to get 
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        ( A . 8 )  
we obtain equations (26) and (27).  
Now consider maximizing welfare,  /( ( )) Wc
γ γ ργ ψ =− . Differentiating and using the fact that 
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       ( A . 9 )  
where 
  z≡ k1f (L1 / k1) + k2g(L2 /k2).         ( A . 1 0 )  
An analytical expression for the maximum cannot be obtained. However, by evaluating this 
derivative at  WK τ ττ ==  we can tell whether maximizing welfare requires the wage tax to be greater 
or smaller than the capital income tax.  At  WK τ τ = , the second term in (A.9) is zero, so we only need 
to sign the first term.  Now  
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  (A.11) 
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For  0 / / 1 1 2 2 > − k L k L , i.e. when the formal sector is more capital intensive, then 
/0
WK W dz d
ττ τ
= <  and hence  / 0 W dW dτ <  at  WK τ τ = . This implies that maximizing welfare requires 
WK τ θτ << . When the informal sector is more capital intensive,  22 110 Lk Lk −< , maximizing 
welfare would require  WK τ θτ >> . 
A.4.   Infrastructure and Second-Best Taxation 
  We can then write the government budget constraint as (1 )( ) WK K α ττ τθ φ − −+ = + . Totally 
differentiating we get (A.7), which implies (26). Since the expression for the growth rate in the 
competitive economy is the same irrespective of the use to which government revenue is put, the 
analysis of the previous section holds and growth is maximized for  WK τ τθ φ = =+. 
Now consider the welfare of the average individual,  )) ( /( γψ ρ γ
γ − = c W . Differentiating 
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where  
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If there is no redistribution, the government budget constraint implies τw = τ K = φ, and  








.       
Hence, welfare is maximized when the two tax rates are set equal to the infrastructure  
requirement. For  0 > θ , and assuming the formal sector is more capital intensive than the informal 
one, 









and welfare is not maximized. 
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